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Mike Mansfield's Asia

Twice in the past half year, former Senate majority. leader Mike Mansfield, now U.S. ambassador to
Japan, has written on the page opposite about a
dwindling American interest in Asia. In his first article,-.Mr. Mansfield flatly labeled this a "myth." He
said 'the United States had more than fulfilled its
"overcommitment" in Indochina, remained ready to
defend South Korea's security, was attuning its
China policy to Asian realities and was dedicated to
present defense arrangements with Japan. Extolling
the..!'moderate course" of the Carter administration,
he said "the United States position in Asia is more
favorable than at any time since World War II."
In his second article, written to coincide with
Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda's current visit to this
country, the ambassador was less confident. He diplom·atically reiterated that present policies point in
the·right direction. But 1\-Ir. Mansfield confessed he
is disturbed by "the perception, widely held in East
Asia, that the United States no longer regards Asia
as important or worthy of much attention." Although he went on to state that the problem "is as
much one of perception as of reality," he rightly
too_k small comfort. in the distinction. Foreign policy
is, after all, largely a matter of perceptions, and to
the"extent that perceptions run counter to intentions
they represent a policy failure.
To the Asian concerns he had listed last October,
Mr. Mansfield added a new one: ,a feeling that the
I

')

l

'.

I

J

administration's emphasis on Europe was allowing
'the U.S. position in Asia to atrophy. Because Asia's
skepticism about the United States is largely a result
of the Indochina experience, the ambassador warned
that America would be judged henceforth "by our
deeds rather than our rhetoric."
As a subtle elder statesman, Ambassador Mansfield refrained from specifying what "deeds" he
would propose. He merely urged patience and persistence in following the present "moderate course."
If successful, this presumably would lead to an easing of the severe trade tensions between the United
States and Japan, to a more rapid pace in normalizing relations with mainland China, to a curtailment
of the U.S. presence in South Korea that would not
destabilize the whole peninsula and to a fulfillment
of the very large U.S. moral commitment to help
Southeast Asia recover from war. Each of these issues, plus the many others abounding in Asia, would
require the kind of U.S. focus on Asia that l'llr. Mansfield finds is missing.
Perhaps the former senator is suffering from "localitis," i.e., too great a preoccupation with one's
host country. Perhaps Europe (and the Middle East)
require some redress from the U.S. entanglement in
Asia. Or perhaps the American people should now
listen to Mr. Mansfield's warnings not to neglect
Asia as they did not listen to his early 1960s warnings against over-involvement in Vietnam.
I 1

~l

.. .... .. ... -

I.'J

, . .. ., .I -

a""'"'

w:w:

,,
;

-;' :::(1 · ~

.,.

')

· 0Prniqn:; ~~:G9J!irne_,ntary

·:··:

"<{:.-·;~::·~~~~~~;\'~;_:if.(~:{)_t->.~_,-; /,,_·:-~;}'=,~:
--:: -THE SUN, Wednesday, May 3, 1978

The United States:~and Eas·t.· Asia: f~~-Vital Linlr.·:';::i.~·
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nations of thtit _: _. means 'simply that we'
·to ;/': rope; as a region of unparalleled
region are growing: aS well . theY r·r·'\vait ,a while' longer for a rup rest~ra- _ r ·-:; stra_tegic ~i~~ific~nce; as the homC'Of I

Washington.
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the nearly one year I have served

United States. 1 Whether in political,
stratE!gic or econOmic terms, there is
no region of greater significance for

causesofthisdisquiet:_ ,
.
r • A feeling that the Carter ad min-

Its policies toward·_ the
arc
soudd ,'leneCting cot1tinuity with the
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our plan to withdraw troops frotn Ko~

military forces in Europe ..yhile allowing them to atrop hy in Asia; ,
• A deep concern that our plans to
'k M f' ld
withdraw troops from Korea, ~h_en
~y M1 e . ans le
the danger there seems und1mm"
· :t~' ...... ishcd, is only the 'first step -in a~new~
~! " ,
I _,. ' • . ..i. ;
1 ) • I. •!'
round of disengagement· from East
this co,untry, nOr n1ore apt i.O affect; '
Asia;
·
for !iood or ill, our future wCII-being.
• A feel ing that, -if Northeast Asia -'
But I have been disturbed by a
is recei ving ih ndequate attention
from the United Slates, Southeast
growing phenomenon: the perception,
widely held in East Asia, that the
Asia is receivi ng virtually none at all.
Un ited States no longer regards Asia
The problem , as I said at the outas important or worthy of much atset, probably is as much one of per·
tcntion: that we are, if not neglecting,
ception as of reali ty. I continue to ,
at least paying insufficient attention
~rgue tha~ there has be?n no)essen ~
to the p~oblems and prospects of that
mg.of the · ~ portn n~e (his co~ ntry a~vast reg1on.
tncnes to As1a, and m t~c. ma•~ that·~
Ja~anese and other Asians have
t rue . _The Carter a_d m m~st~_a t1~n has
explamed to me that there arc several
not g1ven short sh nft to, i\s1an •ssues.
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i · and. political ?bs~rvers ex~mine lnte_r:..}'_ · {;We w,ill 'hav~ to demons,t rate by what :- ~::.. : H~r~ the Pfe)ss Bfld ?the! med1a have
natwnal affatrs Ill geperaJ and 1).8. ~~ _1 · w_e doth~~ We mea" what we say. We :.. . ~an Important co~tnbut10n to make,
·1 policy in particular with a he&lthy ~ "' are heading in the rig~t direction. _If .•/: as do our educational institutions at ·

~icti on that we are strengthening our ' , rea, has evoked constderable cr1ti-
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c1sm. But even that pohcy 1s'8 logical
utension of a process •of gradual re- · . skepticism. They for years heard us ·'.
we persist we will succeed. · '
·· ·L~ ' 1 : all levels.
due~ ion of gio~nd fOrces-as ~pposc.~' -.. ~ p~qclaim fidelity to commitmen~ ,V:'e~J;~~} -~. B~t :'"~teady fo.reign po,li~ -c~u~e ·Vt·1tt~ ~ '. A~ia no }ong~r,. - ~ ,. syn?N'~Ous
to mr and naval forc es-:-be?u_n a d~C:/ 1 had under~k~n, , an~ ~~n . ~~:t> ~-""i'JI!...'"; r,~Q~I~e~.!! ~oupda~1~n p~. ~~r~ng ~ub_h~ .:;~~;.y~}th war. I~ ~e~a1n,A, 1 _1n peace, a,;r~ode Ago. I hnppcn to thmk 1t 1s n wr~'{;' -_. prove unable ,to sUstmn what were lD 11 "·:::, support. 6Ur pohc1es m the SJttJcs
.. gmn, of vAst COf,lScqucnee for th1s
. policy..:.:.jUst aa .it was Wise~~ mOdify
fact over-commitments. We were ', Jacked that foundation; we need to .
coyntry. Our . role . there- poli t/Cfa ,
!· thb ' J}aco
withdrawal in light ·- o~ .~i- faulted for bad judgment a8 well as'} '~ 'rebuild and strengthen it. This means - ,. :'economic, strtilcgic-3Cf\-'CS Ani.~.r1·
likely delays in congressional action f for less than total determination. _-,•~ ~ that as· Asian perception's Or us are :- .. ;.. tan lnterests 'no less vital than thoSe
of compensato-ry military · assistance.
That cxpel-ience, the Indochina co11-' ~t~, -': changin'g·to accord with new realities ..
at stake in Europe: We cannot igt10re
for Korea.
~--:
flict and its outcome, affected Asiarf v' ~:·.' sQ-.. rilust our perceptions :of Asia ·: 1 :"Asia; we must see~. to understand,!!- .
Asian ~isgivings ~bout our com·
perceptions of America just as it d~d·;~ , .. :'change. ~
·J~
}:.·
•
-_;: , __ .- The alternative is tq repeat our ni18· ~;
mi tment in other respects are cqunlly 1, American views of Asia. Botli pur vi~ ~?-~ ·~~~'· Among the American peop1e,Jhere :~~~~ takes ~fthe p~t. :;_!.•
· . '\::~
unwarrante4. We haVe not _a llowCd ' s ~ons are a bit oUt of date. (.· '·.
.•{H· ·i is.Jess ·a ttention paid to Asia. Asia re:-: . t ·, _.. ~- ~.d..;:; ~f~ ~ ~
~" 14 '
our military forces in East Asia , to _
Indochina reinforced Asian skepti ~.: . >:;:.· rfeives less coverage than Europe or ·_ i •. ,, \.- ,
~-;·· ._._. 1 ~ ·-· \·
~"''
weaken, and On the ·contrary arc
cis.m of our motives and our. inten~~: /:-~:~ the 1Middle-- East in our newspapers,' ~ .•. )--: . Mr;. Mansfield, U.S.' ambassa r/nc
inodcrnizi~g and ~trengthen.ing . (~I- ',:i ~ion~j insurilig that( we · ~o-UJ~ .-~qe·l ; ':,f:.,o~~· '~Rgazines and on .i:elevis~~"·r Bu~_,.£ z~to _'"Japan, .{:~ urnC( ~o · ~~shingUJ.n ·
though not e_nlargtn~) those forces.
Judged henceforth _by our Oe~ds ra1h- .. L;·, ~s•a. s9.oul~ ~oom larg~r tha~. .lt docs ; ~ : ..~ )h'f wee~ for th_e .~f/tctal uts.t,t of J~P:
We arc _no~ W1thdraw111g ~rom South· ,, cr than our ~hc~nc. But ~h1s sh9.~14 ._:·.. :,m 8~ cqpsc10usness..we..tnu~t. as a .,.(~-~ anese.P_nme ~~~~s!er Takeo Fuhudaeast As1a_m any s:nse; mstcad, ~ur
not he, ,an ~nsurm?untable ~b_s_ta~le. . ., - l~~·~on1 . ~cknowl.cdgc '~}.m~rtance: .',,' '('he .Prtm~ Mt_ms~er.IJ.!OS schcdu{;cf,fp
~o-operat10n and . mvolvemcnt w1t~ -1 for us m our relat10ns with Asta. lt _. l' · ·as a larger ,tradmg partner than Eu-~ -.~. ·· meet Prest dent Garter today. : '': ! .
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